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Abstract
In this paper we examine the implications of two theories of informational frictions, signal
extraction (SE) and rational inattention (RI), for optimal decisions and economic dynamics
within the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) setting. We rst show that if the variance of
the noise and channel capacity (or marginal information cost) are xed exogenously in the
SE and RI problems, respectively, the two environments lead to di¤erent policy and welfare
implications. We also nd that if the signal-to-noise ratio and capacity in the SE and RI
problems are xed, respectively, the two theories generate the same policy implications in the
univariate case, but di¤erent policy implications in the multivariate case.
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1 Introduction
Muth (1960) applied classical ltering methods to solve for a stochastic process for permanent
income for which Friedman (1956)s adaptive expectations hypothesis would be an optimal es-
timator of permanent income. Specically, Muth (1960) solved a single-agent dynamic signal
extraction (SE) problem, in which an economic agent was modeled as facing exogenous signals
and noises which had to be disentangled, and showed that the exponentially weighted average of
past observations of a random walk plus noise process is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the
mean squared estimation error. Townsend (1983) and Sargent (1991) extended the single-agent
signal extraction problem by studying multiple-agent settings in which agents extract signals from
endogenous variables that are a¤ected by other agentssignal extraction problems. Recently, there
have been some papers examining the e¤ects of heterogeneous information on economic dynamics
within signal extraction settings. For example, Morris and Shin (2002) examined the welfare
e¤ects of asymmetric information in the presence of strategic complementarity; Wang (2004) ex-
amined how imperfect observations on labor income on the estimation risk and precautionary
savings; and Angeletos and LaO (2009) studied how dispersed information about the underlying
aggregate productivity shock contributes signicant noise in the business cycle and helps explain
cyclical variations in observed Solow residuals and labor wedges in the RBC setting. The key
assumption in these signal extraction settings is that the stochastic properties of noises are given
exogenously.
Sims (2003) rst introduced rational inattention (RI) into economics within the linear-quadratic
Gaussian (LQG) setting and argued that it is a plausible method for introducing sluggishness,
randomness, and delay into economic models.1 In his formulation agents have nite Shannon
channel capacity, limiting their ability to process signals about the true state of the world. As a
result, an impulse to the economy induces only gradual responses by individuals, as their limited
capacity requires many periods to discover just how much the state has moved; one key change rel-
ative to the RE case is that consumption has a hump-shaped impulse response to income shocks.2
1For the applications of RI within the (approximate) LQG setting, see (among others) Adam (2005), Kasa
(2006), Luo and Young (2010), Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009), Melosi (2009), Paciello and Wiederholt (2011),
and Kim, Ko, and Yun (2012).
2See Sims (2003) and Luo (2008).
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Luo (2008) used this model to explore anomalies in the consumption literature, particularly the
well-known excess sensitivityand excess smoothnesspuzzles, employing an LQG version of
the standard permanent income model (as in Hall 1978 and Flavin 1981). In that model RI is
equivalent to confronting the household with a noisy signal about the value of permanent income
but permitting the agents to choose the distribution of the noise terms, subject to their limited
capacity. The key feature of the LQG-RI model is that the RI-induced noise is optimal and
generated endogenously due to individualsnite information-processing capacity.3
The main objective of this paper is to compare the two theories. Specically, we explore
the e¤ects of SE and RI for economic dynamics, policy, and welfare within the linear-quadratic-
Gaussian setting. We rst study a univariate case for which the models can be solved in closed-
form. The rst result we nd is that if the variance of the noise itself is xed, we can use a policy
experiment to distinguish SE from RI as they lead to di¤erent dynamic behavior, policy, and
welfare implications. Specically, we assume that the variance of the exogenous shock is scaled
up due to a change in policy. In the SE problem with exogenous noises, an increase in the variance
of the exogenous shock will lead to a di¤erent solution for the conditional variance and Kalman
gain; consequently, the change in policy will eventually lead to a change in the models dynamic
behavior and the agents welfare. In contrast, in the RI problem, if channel capacity is xed, a
change in the variance of the exogenous shock will lead to the same change in the conditional
variance of the state and the variance of the noise, but has no e¤ect on the Kalman gain. That is,
inattentive agents with xed capacity will behave as if they face noise shocks whose nature changes
systematically as the dynamic properties of the economy change with policy. Furthermore, we
show that once we assume that the marginal cost of information is xed, capacity will be elastic
with respect to a change in policy; consequently, the Kalman gain in this case will adjust with
respect to the policy change and the change in policy has di¤erent quantitative impacts on the
model dynamics under this case and the SE case.
The welfare losses of agents due to imperfect information also depend on the value of the
Kalman gain. Therefore, SE and RI can lead to di¤erent policy and welfare implications in the
3Fully non-LQG versions of the RI problem are solved and discussed in Sims (2005, 2006), Lewis (2006), Tutino
(2009), and Metajka and Sims (2010). The main feature of the non-LQG RI models is that they have either very
short horizons or extremely simple setups due to numerical obstacles. We comment in the conclusion about the
di¢ culty of extending our results to non-LQG environments.
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LQ setting. We also nd that in the univariate case, if the ratio of the variance of the exogenous
shock to that of the noise (i.e., the signal-to-noise ratio, SNR) is xed, the SE and RI problems
are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same dynamics of the model
economy when the ratio of the conditional variance to that of the noise in the SE problem is equal
to 1  1= exp (2) in the RI problem in which  is the exogenously given channel capacity. After
considering correlated shocks and noise, we nd that our results remain unchanged.
We then move on to study the multivariate case in which the state vector includes multiple
elements. In this case given channel capacity the conditional variance-covariance matrix can be
obtained by solving a semidenite programming problem in which the inattentive agent minimizes
the expected welfare losses due to information-processing constraints. After computing the opti-
mal steady state conditional variance-covariance matrix, we can recover the variance-covariance
matrix of the noise vector and then determine the Kalman gain. In this case, we show that SE
and RI will lead to di¤erent dynamic behavior and deliver di¤erent policy and welfare implication
after the government implements a policy that changes the variance of the exogenous shock even
if the signal-to-noise ratio is xed. However, when modeling the multivariate SE problem, it
is di¢ cult to specify the process of the vector of noises ex ante without prior knowledge about
the states. Ad hoc assumptions on the nature of the noise might be inconsistent the underlying
e¢ ciency conditions (equalization of the marginal utility of additional capacity across variables).4
Therefore, RI provides a useful and microfounded way to specify the stochastic properties of the
noises by solving the agents constrained optimization problem. It is worth noting that in the
multivariate RI problem, the agents preference, budget constraint, and information-processing
constraints jointly determine the values of the conditional variance of the state, the variance of
the noise, and the Kalman gain, whereas in the multivariate SE problem given the variance of the
noise, the propagation equation updating the conditional variance based on the budget constraint
is used to determined the conditional variance and then the Kalman gain.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines optimal decisions and
economic dynamics in an LQG setting with signal extraction. Section 3 presents the RI version of
the model and compares di¤erent implications of RI and SE on the dynamic behavior, policy and
welfare within the LQG setting. Section 4 presents applications to permanent income models.
4See Melosi (2009) for an empirical investigation of this issue.
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Section 5 concludes.
2 Signal Extraction in a LQG Model
2.1 Full-information Rational Expectations LQG Model
Consider the following linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) model:
v (s0) = maxfct;st+1g
E0
" 1X
t=0
t
 
sTt Qst + c
T
t Rct + 2c
T
t Wst
#
; (1)
subject to
st+1 = Ast +Bct + "t+1; (2)
with s0 known and given, where  is the discount factor, st is a (n 1) state vector, ct is a
(k  1) control vector, "t+1 is an iid (n 1) vector of Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and
covariance matrix 
, and Et [] denotes the mathematical expectation of a random variable given
information processed at t. We assume that Q, R, and W are such that the objective function is
jointly concave in st and ct, and the usual conditions required for the optimal policy to exist are
satised.
When the agent can fully observe the state st, the model is a standard linear-quadratic regu-
lator problem. Solving the corresponding Bellman equation
sTt Pst = maxct

sTt Qst + c
T
t Rct + 2c
T
t Wst + Et
 
sTt A
T + cTt B
T + "Tt+1

P (Ast +Bct + "t+1)
	
;
yields the decision rule
ct =  Fst; (3)
and the Riccati equation is
P = Q+ F TRF   2F TW +   AT   F TBT P (A BF ) ; (4)
where
F =
 
R+ BTPB
 1  
W + BTPA

: (5)
Iterating on the matrix Riccati equation (4) uniquely determines P , since the equation denes a
contraction mapping. Using P , we can determine F in the optimal policy (5).
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2.2 Signal Extraction with Exogenous Noises
Following the signal extraction literature (e.g., Muth 1960; Lucas 1972, 1973; Morris and Shin
2002), we now assume that the agent cannot observe the true state st perfectly and only observes
the noisy signal st = st + t when making decisions. Here t is a (n 1) vector of noises. The
agent then estimates the state using a standard Kalman ltering equation. In the standard signal
extraction problem, the stochastic property of the noise t is given exogenously. Specically,
assume that t is an iid Gaussian innovation with mean 0 and variance-covariance matrix .5 We
point out here that the agent may not have perfect information even about the endogenous part
of the state vector st.
Under the LQG assumption, the certainty equivalence principle holds when the agent cannot
observe st perfectly, so the decision rule under imperfect information can be written as
ct =  Fbst; (6)
where bst = E [stjIt] is the perceived state and It = st ; st 1;   ; s0	 is the information set
including perceived signals until time t.
Furthermore, we assume that in the steady state, the true state follows a normal distribution
after observing the noisy signals stjIt  N (E [stjIt] ;t), where t = Et
h
(st   bst) (st   bst)T i
is the conditional variance-covariance matrix, and the Kalman ltering equation governs the
behavior of bst bst+1 = (1  t) (Abst +Bct) + tst+1; (7)
where t is the Kalman gain to be determined.6 Following the standard procedure in the Kalman
lter literature, we have the updating equation for t,
t+1 = (I   t)AtAT (I   t)T + (I   t) 
 (I   t)T + tTt ; (8)
and the optimal Kalman gain
t =
 

 +AtA
T
  

 +AtA
T + 
 1
: (9)
5Our quadratic objective function encompasses the standard tracking objective of minimizing the squared dif-
ference of the control from the target.
6Muth (1960) showed that the exponentially weighted average of past observations of a random walk plus a noise
process is optimal in the sense that it minimizes the mean squared forecast error.
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If iterations on  and  using (8) and (9) converge, in the steady state we have
 = (I   )  AAT + 
 (I   )T + T (10)
and
 =
 

 +AAT
  

 +AAT + 
 1
: (11)
(Baxter, Graham, and Wright 2010 discussed the convergence of the Ricatti equation for Kalman
ltering problems with endogenous variables.) Starting from the initial condition 0, we can
compute the steady state (;) by iterating on (10) and (11). After computing (;), we can
obtain a complete characterization of the dynamic system. The key assumption in the SE problem
is that the variance-covariance matrix of the noise, , is given. Given this , (10) and (11) jointly
determine the steady state (;).
It is straightforward to show that we have the following alternative equations for computing
the Kalman gain and the conditional variance-covariance matrix, (;):
t+1 = 	t  	t (	t + t) 1 	t; (12)
and
t = t
 1
t ; (13)
where 	t = AtAT + 
 is the conditional variance of the state prior to observing the new signal
at t+ 1. In the steady state, (12) and (13) reduce to
 1 =  1  	 1: (14)
and
 =  1; (15)
respectively. After obtaining (15), (42), (6), and (7) completely characterize the models dynamic
behavior.
3 Rational Inattention in the LQG Model
Following Sims (2003), we introduce rational inattention (RI) into the LQG model proposed
in Section 2.1 by assuming agents face information-processing constraints and have only nite
6
Shannon channel capacity to observe the state of the world. Specically, we use the concept of
entropy from information theory to characterize the uncertainty about a random variable; the
reduction in entropy is thus a natural measure of information ow. Formally, entropy is dened
as the expectation of the negative of the (natural) log of the density function,  E [ln (f (X))].
For example, the entropy of a discrete distribution with equal weight on two points is simply
E [ln2 (f (X))] =  0:5 ln (0:5)   0:5 ln (0:5) = 0:69, and the unit of information contained in this
distribution is 0:69 nats.7 In this case, an agent can remove all uncertainty about X if the
capacity devoted to monitoring X is  = 0:69 nats.
With nite capacity  2 (0;1) ; a variable s following a continuous distribution cannot be
observed without error and thus the information set at time t+1; It+1; is generated by the entire
history of noisy signals
n
sj
ot+1
j=0
. Following the literature, we assume the noisy signal takes the
additive form st+1 = st+1 +t+1; where t+1 is the endogenous noise caused by nite capacity. We
further assume that t+1 is an iid idiosyncratic shock and is independent of the fundamental shock.
Note that the reason that the RI-induced noise is idiosyncratic is that the endogenous noise arises
from the consumers own internal information-processing constraint. Agents with nite capacity
will choose a new signal st+1 2 It+1 =

s1; s2;   ; st+1
	
that reduces the uncertainty of the
state variable st+1 as much as possible. Formally, this idea can be described by the information
constraint
H (st+1jIt) H (st+1jIt+1) ; (16)
where  is the investors information channel capacity, H (st+1j It) denotes the entropy of the
state prior to observing the new signal at t+ 1; and H (st+1j It+1) is the entropy after observing
the new signal.  imposes an upper bound on the amount of information that is, the change
in the entropy  that can be transmitted in any given period. We assume that the noise t+1
is Gaussian.8 Finally, following the literature, we suppose that the prior distribution of st+1 is
Gaussian.
Under the LQG setting, as shown in Sims (2003, 2006), the true state under RI also follows
a normal distribution stjIt  N (E [stjIt] ;t), where t = Et
h
(st   bst) (st   bst)T i. In addition,
7For alternative bases for the logarithm, the unit of information di¤ers; with log base 2 the unit of information
is the bitand with base 10 it is a ditor a hartley.
8As shown in Sims (2003), within the LQG setting Gaussian noise is optimal.
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in the steady state the agent observes an additive noisy signal: st = st + t. Note that in the RI
problem we also have the usual formula for updating the conditional variance-covariance matrix
of a Gaussian distribution t:
t+1 = 	t  	t (	t + t) 1 	t: (17)
If iterations on  converge (which depends on both A and ), (17) reduces to  = 	  
	 (	 + ) 1 	, which can be solved for
 1 =  1  	 1: (18)
Using these expressions, the Kalman gain K can be rewritten as
 =  1: (19)
3.1 The Univariate Case
The key di¤erence between SE and RI is that under RI the agent faces the information-processing
constraint
  ln (jt+1j) + ln
 ATtA+ 
  2: (20)
Since more information about the state is better in single-agent models, this constraint will be
binding.9 Considering the univariate state case n = 1, (20) fully determines the value of the
steady state conditional variance :
 =


exp (2) A2 ; (21)
which means that  is determined by the variance of the exogenous shock (
) and the exogenously
given capacity ().10 Given this , we can use (18) to recover the variance of the endogenous
noise ():
 =
 
 1  	 1 1 ; (22)
9By betterwe mean that conditional on draws by nature for the true state, the expected utility of the agent
increases if information about that state is improved.
10Note that here we need to impose the restriction exp (2)   A2 > 0. If this condition fails, the state is not
stabilizable and the unconditional variance diverges. Obviously we cannot directly impose conditions on A, since
it is chosen by the agents in the model; it is also clear that we can, for a given model, often easily nd su¢ cient
conditions that guarantee the restriction holds.
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where 	 = A2 + 
, and use (19) to nd the Kalman gain ():
 =  1 = 1  	 1: (23)
Substituting (21) and (22) into (23), we have
 = 1  1
exp (2)
: (24)
Note that (22) and (23) also hold in the SE problem. To compare the RI and SE problems in the
univariate case, we rst make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Assume that  is xed exogenously in the SE case.
Under Assumption 1, it is clear that in the SE problem given  and 
, we can compute  by
solving the nonlinear equation (14). After obtaining , we can use (15) to determine the Kalman
gain ; thus, in this sense SE and RI have the same implications.
We now discuss how to use a policy experiment to distinguish RI from SE. Suppose that
the variance of the exogenous shock, 
, is scaled up due to a change in policy. In the SE
problem with xed , Equations (22) and (23) imply that an increase in 
 will generally lead to
a di¤erent solution for  and ; consequently, the change in policy will lead to a change in the
models dynamics. Since  is a nonlinear function of 
, the e¤ect of changes in 
 on  could be
complicated. In the next section, we will explore this relationship using some numerical examples
in a permanent income model. In contrast, in the RI problem, if  is xed, (21), (22), and (23)
imply that a change in 
 will lead to the same change in , 	, and , but has no impact on
. In other words, agents with xed capacity will behave as if facing noise whose nature changes
systematically as the dynamic properties of the economy change, i.e., the change in policy does
not change the models dynamics.
Assumption 2. Assume that the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), 
 1, is xed exogenously in the
SE case.
Note that Equation (22) can be rewritten as

 1 = 
 1  
h
A2
 

 1
 1
+ 1
i 1
: (25)
Under Assumption 2, since the SNR is xed, 25) can be used to solve for 
 1. Given the SNR
and 
 1, we can compute
 1 =
 

 1
  

 1

: (26)
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Consider the same case in which 
 is scaled up, Assumption 2 means that the exogenous noise
should also be scaled up such that 
 1 is xed at the same level; consequently, (25) leads to the
same solution for 
 1 and (26) leads to the same  1. The following proposition summarizes
the main conclusion in this case:
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 2 (i.e., the SNR is xed), the SE and RI problems are obser-
vationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same dynamics if  is xed and  1 in
the SE problem is equal to 1  1= exp (2) in the RI problem.
Proof. The proof is straightforward by comparing (24) and (26).
In the above analysis, for simplicity we assume that  remains unchanged when 
 is a¤ected
by the government policy. However, if an increase in 
 leads to higher marginal welfare losses
due to imperfect observations, some capacity may be reallocated from other sources to reduce
the welfare losses due to low capacity. In this case,  will change accordingly as it is completely
determined by capacity ; consequently, the dynamic behavior of the model will also change in
response to the change in 
. We will further explore this issue in the next subsection and the
permanent income model examined in Section 4.
3.1.1 Alternative Way to Model Limited Information-Processing Capacity
As argued in Sims (2010), instead of using xed nite channel capacity to model limited information-
processing ability, it is also reasonable to assume that the marginal cost of information processing
is constant. That is, the Lagrange multiplier on (20) is constant. In the univariate case, if the
decision rule under full information is ct = Hst and the objective of the agent with nite capacity
is to minimize
P1
t=0 
t (ct   ct )2, the optimization problem reduces to
min
t
1X
t=0
t

H2t +  ln

A2t 1 + 

t

;
where t is the conditional variance at t,  is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to (20), and
we impose the restriction that A = 1 for simplicity. Solving this problem yields the optimal
conditional variance:
t =  =
  (
H   A) +
q
(
H   A)2 + 4
A2
2HA2
> 0: (27)
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It is straightforward to show that as  goes to 0,  = 0; and as  goes to 1,  =1. Comparing
(27) with (21), it is clear that the two modeling strategies are observationally equivalent in the
sense that they lead to the same conditional variance if the following equality holds:
 =
1
2
ln
0@R2 + 2HA2
  [H  A (=
)] +
q
[H  A (=
)]2 + 4A2 (=
)
1A : (28)
It is obvious that as  converges to its lower limit = ln (R) as  goes to 1; and it converges to
1 as  goes to 0.11 In other words, using this RI modeling strategy, the agent is allowed to adjust
the optimal level of capacity in such a way that the marginal cost of information-processing for
the problem at hand remains constant. Note that this result is consistent with the concept of
elasticcapacity proposed in Kahneman (1973).
Furthermore, it is clear from (28) that if the cost of information processing () is xed, an
increase in fundamental uncertainty (
) will lead to higher capacity () devoted to monitoring the
evolution of the state. We now consider the same policy experiment discussed above: 
 is scaled
up due to a change in policy. If we adopt the assumption that  is xed, (27) means that there
is no change in  because @ ln @ ln 
 < 1. (Note that in the xed  case,
@ ln 
@ ln 
 = 1.) Consequently,
a change in 
 will change  and the models dynamics if the inattentive agent is facing xed
marginal cost of information. Therefore, di¤erent ways to model RI may lead to di¤erent policy
implications.12
3.1.2 Extension to Correlated Shocks and Noises
In the above analysis, we assumed that the exogenous fundamental shock and noise are uncorre-
lated. We now discuss how correlated shocks and noises a¤ect the implications of SE and RI for
the models dynamic behavior. In real systems, we may observe correlated shocks and noises. For
example, if the system is an airplane and winds are bu¤eting the plane, the random gusts of wind
a¤ect both the process (the airplane dynamics) and the measurement (the sensed wind speed) if
people use an anemometer to measure wind speed as an input to the Kalman lter.
11We require here that H 6= 0; that is, the state must be detectable.
12Note that these two di¤erent ways to model RI is very similar to the constraint and multiplier preferences
adopted by Hansen and Sargent (2007) to model robustness. They also established the observational equivalence
between the two preferences within the LQG setting.
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It is straightforward to introduce correlated shocks and noises into the SE problem. Specif-
ically, we consider the case in which the process shock (") and the noise () are correlated as
follows:
corr ("t+1; t+1) = ;
cov ("t+1; t+1) =   = 
p


p
;
where  is the correlation coe¢ cient between "t+1 and t+1, 
 = var ["t+1] and  = var [t+1].
Under SE,  is given exogenously and the correlation just introduces another exogenous stochastic
dimension on the noise. As shown in Simon (2006), in this case the optimal Kalman gain can be
written as
 = (	 +  ) (	 +  + 2 ) 1 ; (29)
and the updating formula for the conditional variance is:
 = 	  (	 +  )2 (	 +  + 2 ) 1 ; (30)
where 	 = 
 + A2. Just like the case without the correlation, given  and  , (29) and (30)
jointly determine the steady state (;).
In the RI problem, the correlation generalizes the assumption in Sims (2003) on the uncor-
related RI-induced noise. The presence of correlation between shocks and noises does not a¤ect
the conditional variance  since  = 

A2 exp(2) . In the steady state, (30) can be rewritten as the
following quadratic equation in terms of
p
:

2
  (	  ) + 2p
p + 	 = 0, which
can be solved for
p
 =
 p
 +p22
  	 [2
  (	  )]
2
  (	  ) : (31)
It is clear from (31) that if  is xed, the change in 
 will lead to the same change in , 	, and
, but has no e¤ect on the Kalman gain  =  1. That is, the presence of correlated noise does
not change the dynamic behavior of the model.
3.2 The Multivariate Case
In the multivariate RI problem, it is much more di¢ cult to determine the steady state conditional
variance-covariance matrix  because it cannot be computed analytically. Here we follow Sims
(2003) and calculate the expected welfare loss due to imperfect observations under RI. Specically,
12
we assume that the value functions under full information and imperfect information can be
written as
v (st) = s
T
t Pst and bv (bst) = bsTt bPbst,
respectively.13 We can compute the optimal  by minimizing the expected welfare loss due to RI,
Et [v (st)  bv (bst)] ; (32)
subject to information-processing constraints. Note that to solve this problem numerically, we
need to use a two-stage procedure.14 First, under the linear-quadratic-Gaussian assumption, the
certainty equivalence principle applies and the decision rule under imperfect information,
ct =  Fbst; (33)
is independent of  or . We then use this decision rule to determine bv (bst) which depends on 
and . Applying the welfare criterion proposed in (32), we can solve for optimal steady state 
and .
Solving the problem posed in (32) is equivalent to solving the semidenite programming prob-
lem
max

ftrace ( Z)g (34)
subject to
  log (jj) + log  ATA+ 
  2; (35)
ATA+ 
  ; (36)
where Z = F TRF   2F TW +   F TBTPBF + F TBTPA+ATPBF  (see online appendix 1.1
for the derivation). If the positive-deniteness constraint on ATA+ 
 , (36), does not bind,
the rst-order condition for  can be written as follows:
Z = 
h
A
 
AAT + 

 1
AT    1
i
; (37)
which can be reduced to:
 1 =
 
GGT +G0
 1   Z

; (38)
13See also Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009).
14Sims (2010) also applied this principle solve a tracking problem with information constraints.
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where G =
 
AT
 1
A and G0 =
 
AT
 1

A 1. We can then use standard methods to solve (38).
When applied to a permanent income model in the next section, we rst solve this equation and
then check whether in fact (36) is satised by the optimal solution of . If so, the problem is
solved.15
After computing the optimal steady state , we can then use (18) to determine the steady
state  and (19) to determine the Kalman gain . Therefore, the key di¤erence between SE and
RI is that in the SE problem we need to specify the process of the noise rst, whereas in the RI
problem we need to rst specify the value of channel capacity that determines the steady state
conditional variance of the state by solving the semidenite programming problem proposed in
(34) subject to (35) and (36).16 Theoretically, it is clear that after solving an RI problem, we can
always reconstruct a SE problem using the resulting endogenous noise due to RI as the input,
and the two models are observationally equivalent in this sense. However, it is di¢ cult to specify
the process of the vector of noises ex ante when modeling the multivariate SE problem.17
When modeling the multivariate RI problem we only need to set a value for channel capacity
and then compute optimal conditional variance-covariance matrices of the state and the variance-
covariance matrices of the noise vector by solving the constrained semidenite minimization prob-
lem (34). Therefore, in the multivariate RI problem, the agents preference, budget constraint,
and information-processing constraints jointly determine the values of , , and , whereas in
the multivariate SE problem given , (18) that is used to determine  and  only depends on
the budget constraint. If the noise in SE is specied exogenously, it may violate the optimality
conditions for RI; for example, Melosi (2009) showed that a particular estimated SE model does
not equate the marginal utility of attention across states, implying that the variance-covariance
matrix of the noise would not be consistent with any channel capacity. Of course, obtaining the
marginal utility of attention requires solving the RI problem, so it will be di¢ cult to specify ex
ante an SE problem consistent with RI.
15 If this constraint does not bind, in principle we can apply the logic of the reverse water-lling problem to solve
for . In practice, this method has proven numerically unstable.
16Note that the basic idea of solving the multivariate RI problem is the same as that in the univariate model and
thus the key di¤erence between SE and RI problems remains unchanged.
17This problem will be particularly di¢ cult for non-LQG problems, since the distribution of the noise shocks will
generally be impossible to specify analytically.
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We now consider the di¤erent policy e¤ects of RI and SE in the multivariate case. We rst
assume that initially the SE and RI problems have the same Kalman gain that generates the
same dynamic behavior. Suppose that the variance-covariance matrix of the exogenous shock, 
,
is scaled up due to a change in policy.18 In the SE problem with xed , Equations (22) and (23)
imply that a change of 
 will lead to a di¤erent solution for  and , i.e., the change in policy will
lead to a change in the models dynamics. In contrast, in the multivariate RI problem, as shown
in (34)-(36), a change in 
 will have complicated e¤ects on , , and . In other words, in the
multivariate case a change in policy will a¤ect the models behavior in both SE and RI problems.
(Note that in the univariate case the change in policy does not change the models dynamics.)
We next consider the e¤ects of RI and SE under Assumption 2 (i.e., the SNR, 
 1, is xed
in the SE problem). As before, we assume that initially the SE and RI problems have the same
Kalman gain. To illustrate how a change in 
 a¤ects the Kalman gain in RI and SE problems
under Assumption 2, we multiply  on both sides of (22):
 1 = I   AAT 1 +  
 1   1 1 , (39)
where I is the identity matrix and we use the fact that 
 1 =
 

 1
  
 1

. Under Assump-
tion 2, the policy has the same impact on 
 and  to keep the SNR xed. (39) clearly shows
that if the policy changes  and then AAT 1, it will a¤ect  =  1 even under Assumption
2. Multiplying 
 on both sides of (22) gives

 1 = 
 1    AAT
 1 + I 1 ; (40)
which means that a change in 
 will lead to di¤erent  given that 
 1 is xed. Note that in
the univariate case, AAT 1 = A2, which means that the policy has no impact on , and the
SE and RI problems cannot be distinguished by the policy under Assumption 2 that the SNR,

 1, is xed.
4 Applications to the Permanent Income Model
In this section we consider the e¤ects of SE and RI for consumption dynamics and their policy
and welfare implications in an otherwise standard permanent income model. As in the previous
18That is, all elements in the variance-covariance matrix are scaled up.
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section we rst consider applications to the univariate case and then discuss applications to the
multivariate case.
We are not the rst to examine this model. Sims (2003) examined how RI a¤ects consumption
dynamics when the agent only has limited capacity when processing information. Luo (2008)
showed that the RI permanent income can be solved explicitly even if the income process is not
iid, and then examines how RI can resolve the well-known excess smoothness and excess sensitivity
puzzles; that model admits a reduction to a single state variable.19
4.1 The Univariate Case
Following Luo (2008), we have the following univariate version of the standard permanent in-
come model (Hall 1978, Flavin 1981) in which households solve the dynamic consumption-savings
problem
v(s0) = maxfctg
E0
" 1X
t=0
tu(ct)
#
(41)
subject to
st+1 = Rst   ct + t+1; (42)
where u(ct) =  12 (ct   c)2 is the period utility function, c > 0 is the bliss point, ct is consumption,
st = wt +
1
R
1X
j=0
R jEt [yt+j ] (43)
is permanent income (the expected present value of lifetime resources), consisting of nancial
wealth (wt) plus human wealth,
t+1 =
1
R
1X
j=t+1

1
R
j (t+1)
(Et+1   Et) [yj ] ; (44)
is the time (t+ 1) innovation to permanent income with mean 0 and variance !2 , wt is cash-on-
hand (or market resources), yt is a general income process with Gaussian white noise innovations, 
is the discount factor, and R is the constant gross interest rate at which the consumer can borrow
and lend freely. We assume y follows an AR(1) process with persistence coe¢ cient  2 [0; 1],
19The excess smoothness puzzle states that consumption responds too little to permanent changes in income.
The excess sensitivity puzzle states that current consumption responds to changes in income that were anticipated
in earlier periods.
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yt+1 = yt + "t+1, where "t+1  N
 
0; !2

, t+1 = "t+1= (R  ). For the rest of the paper we
will restrict attention to points where ct < c, so that utility is increasing and concave; following
the literature we impose the restriction that R = 1, because it implies a stationary path for
consumption. This specication follows that in Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981) and implies that
optimal consumption is determined solely by permanent income:
ct = (R  1) st: (45)
Within this LQG setting, the certainty equivalence principle holds and introducing SE or RI lead
to the following new consumption function:
ct = (R  1) bst; (46)
where bst = Et [st] is the perceived state and is governed by the following Kalman ltering equation
bst+1 = (1  ) (Rbst   ct) +  (st+1 + t+1) ; (47)
where  is the Kalman gain, and given s0  N
 bs0; 2. As shown in Luo (2008), combining (42),
(46), with (47) yields the following expression for the change in consumption:
ct = (R  1)

t
1  (1  )R  L + 

t   Rt 1
1  (1  )R  L

; (48)
where L is the lag operator. We require (1  )R2 < 1, the model equivalent of the stabilizability
condition stated before (this condition implies (1   )R < 1 since R > 1). This MA(1) process
shows that the dynamic behavior of the model is strongly inuenced by the Kalman gain . Using
the explicit expression for consumption growth (48), we can compute the key stochastic properties
of consumption process: the volatility of consumption growth, the persistence of consumption
growth, and the correlation between consumption growth and income shocks.20 All these moments
depend on the Kalman gain. In other words, SE and RI lead to di¤erent consumption processes
if and only if the resulting  di¤ers.
4.1.1 Policy Implications under SE and RI
In this univariate permanent income model, substituting A = R into Equation (25),
!2
 1 = !2
 1  
h
R2
 
!2
 1 1 + 1i 1 ; (49)
20See Luo (2008) for a discussion on the e¤ects of RI on consumption dynamics.
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where !2
 1 =

!2
 1
  
 1

, and denote  =  1 and  = !2
 1, we obtain the following
relation between  and :
 = 

1
1    R
2

: (50)
Solving for  yields
 =
  (1 + ) +
q
(1 + )2 + 4R2 ( +R2)
2R2
; (51)
where we omit the negative root of  as both  and  must be positive. Figure 1 below illustrates
the relationship between  and  given R = 1:02 and  2 [0:1; 10]. It clearly shows that  is an
increasing function of , the signal-to-noise ratio. Also, as  !1,  ! 1.
In the RI version of the permanent income model, we have
 =


exp (2) R2 ; (52)
 =
 
 1  	 1 1 ; (53)
where 	 = R2 + 
. Using (52) and (53), the Kalman lter gain under RI can be written as
 =  1 = 1  1
exp (2)
: (54)
Comparing (51) with (54), it is clear that the signal to noise ratio () and the level of channel
capacity () have one-to-one correspondence. Figure 2 shows that the relationship between  and
 when the SE and RI problems are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the
same consumption dynamics governed by the Kalman gain . This result is consistent with the
general conclusion we obtained using Assumption 2 in the previous section.
Using the same expression for , (51), we can examine how Assumption 1 can be used to
distinguish SE and RI when implementing a change in government policy. Specically, in the SE
problem, we assume that before the government implements stabilization policies, the signal-to-
noise ratio  =
!2
 = 2. In this case,  = 0:79. After the government implements these policies,
the variance of the shock to permanent income will be reduced from !2 to 0:5!
2
 . Since  is xed
under Assumption 1,  =
!2
 will fall from 2 to 1; consequently,  = 0:74. We now assume that the
RI and SE problems are observationally equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same  = 0:79
before implementing the stabilization policies. After implementing these policies, !2 will be scaled
down to 0:5!2 , and the RI theory predicts that both  and  will be scaled down to 0:5 and
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0:5, respectively.21 Consequently, the Kalman lter gain,  =  1 = 0:79, remains unchanged.
In other words, stabilization policy have di¤erent implications for consumption dynamics in the
SE and RI models.
Alternatively, if we assume that the cost of information processing () is xed, the optimal
conditional variance equals
 =
  [
 (R  1)  R] +
q
[
 (R  1)  R]2 + 4
R2
2 (R  1)R2 : (55)
Comparing (55) with (52), it is clear that the two modeling strategies are observationally equivalent
in the sense that they lead to the same conditional variance if the following equality holds:
 =
1
2
ln
0BB@R2 + 2 (R  1)R2
 
h
(R  1) R

=!2
i
+
rh
(R  1) R

=!2
i2
+ 4R2

=!2

1CCA : (56)
In this case, the Kalman gain is
 = 1 
8>><>>:R2 +
2 (R  1)R2
 
h
(R  1) R

=!2
i
+
rh
(R  1) R

=!2
i2
+ 4R2

=!2

9>>=>>;
 1
: (57)
After implementing these policies, !2 is scaled down to 0:5!
2
 , and the xed  theory predicts that
the Kalman lter gain,  =  1, is reduced. For example, before the government implements
stabilization policies, we have =!2 = 0:000135 and  = 0:79. After the policy, we can easily
calculate that  = 0:68 using (57). Figure 3 plots the di¤erent implications of SE and RI for
consumption dynamics after implementing the stabilization policy: consumption growth falls
more (less) under SE than RI when  is xed (when  is xed), since the Kalman gain decreases
(increases).22
4.1.2 Welfare E¤ects of Imperfect Information under SE and RI
Given the restriction that R = 1, the value function for the RI or SE models is
bv (bs0) =  (R  1)R
2
bs20 +Rcbs0   12R

1
R  1c
2 + !2

; (58)
21A proof is straightforward from Expressions (52) and (53).
22 In principle one might be able to use policy changes to distinguish the models, although in practice identication
would seem to be a serious obstacle.
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where
!2 = var [t+1] =

1  (1  )R2!
2
 > !
2
 ; (59)
and
t+1 = 

t+1
1  (1  )R  L

+

t+1   Rt
1  (1  )R  L

: (60)
With the Kalman gain  < 1, !2 > !
2
 and it then follows that !
2
 is decreasing in .
Proposition 2 @!
2

@ < 0:
Proof. By simple calculation we obtain
@!2
@
=
 
1 R2!2
[1  (1  )R2]2 < 0 (61)
because R > 1 and 1  (1  )R2 > 0.
The value function (58), together with (59) and (61) clearly show that imperfect observations
due to nite capacity lead to more uncertainty about the state, which thus increases welfare
losses. More importantly, they also show that after implementing the stabilization policy discussed
in the preceding subsection, SE and RI will lead to di¤erent welfare implications of imperfect
observations. The reason is that the policy will lead to di¤erent Kalman gain in the SE and RI
problem and thus a¤ects the welfare losses due to imperfect information. Using the same example
discussed above, when !2 is reduced to 0:5!
2
 ,  = 0:79 under RI when  is xed, where it is
equal to 0:74 under SE. That is, given the same initial conditions, the stabilization policy will
reduce the welfare of agents under SE, whereas it has no e¤ect on agents with RI. The intuition
is that the stochastic property of the noise in the RI problem changes accordingly in response to
the change in the policy.
Since imperfect information about the state cannot help in decision making, we can use an
alternative welfare criterion, the expected welfare gap between the unconstrained value function
and the constrained value function conditional on the processed information at the current period,
to evaluate di¤erent welfare implications of SE and RI.23 Note that the unconstrained value
function in the full-information case can be written as
v (st) =  (R  1)R
2
s2t +Rcst  
1
2
R

1
R  1c
2 + !2

: (62)
23 Imperfect information cannot make a single decision-maker better o¤, but of course that result need not hold
when agents interact.
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The expected welfare gap due to imperfect information,  (; ), can thus be written as follows:
 (; ) = Et [v (st)  bv (bst)] (63)
=  (R  1)R
2
var t [st]  1
2
R
 
!2   !2

=  (R  1)R
2
 +
1
2
R


1  (1  )R2   1

!2 ;
where the expectation, Et [], is conditional on processed information at time t and  is the
conditional variance of the state. (See online appendix 1.2 for the derivation.) From (63), we can
clearly see that imperfect information a¤ects the welfare gap via two channels:
1. The post-observation variance, i.e., the conditional variance of the state, . The rst term
in (63) means that a larger conditional variance will decrease welfare. The intuition behind
this result is that bs2t in the constrained value function is in the time-t information set, while
s2t in the constrained value function is not in the information set; consequently, Et

s2t

> bs2t .
However, when R is close to 1, this term is close to 0 and thus has little e¤ect on welfare.
2. The innovation to the level of perceived permanent income, t+1, is more volatile than that
to the level of actual permanent income, t+1. That is, !2 > !
2
 . Therefore, the second term
in (63) means that imperfect information will reduce welfare by increasing the volatility
of the innovation to the perceived state. Note that the unconstrained value function is
determined by the dynamics of the actual state st:
st+1 = Rst   ct + t+1; (64)
whereas the constrained value function is determined by the dynamics of bst:
bst+1 = Rbst   ct + t+1: (65)
As will be shown later in (67), the second channel will dominate the rst channel and thus
imperfect information always leads to welfare losses.
To evaluate the di¤erent e¤ects of SE and RI on the welfare losses under government stabi-
lization policies, we divide !2 on both sides of (63) and obtain
e (;K) ,  (; )
!2
=  (R  1)R
2


+
1
2
R


1  (1  )R2   1

; (66)
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where we use the fact that 
!2
= 

!2
=  , where  = !
2
= is dened as the signal-to-noise ratio.
Using (66), we can examine how stabilization policies a¤ect the welfare losses under SE and RI.
Specically, after implementing the stabilization policy (i.e., !2 is reduced to 0:5!
2
 ), SE and RI
will lead to di¤erent welfare losses via  and . Under RI, when  is xed and !2 is reduced to
0:5!2 , the conditional variance will fall from  to 0:5 but  = 0:79 will remain unchanged. (66)
therefore implies that (;)
!2
will remain the same after implementing the policy as RI has no
impact on the signal-to-noise ratio . In contrast, under SE, under Assumption 1 (i.e.,  is xed),
 will be reduced to 0:74. (66) therefore implies that (;)
!2
will be reduced after implementing the
policy as  will fall to 0:5. That is, given the same initial conditions ( = 0:79), the stabilization
policy will lead to smaller welfare losses in the SE model than in the RI model. Note that under
RI, substituting  =
!2
1=(1 ) R2 , into (63), we can further simplify (63) as follows:
 (;K) =
1
2
!2 (R  1)
(1  )R2
1  (1  )R2 ; (67)
which means that given !2 , the welfare loss is decreasing with the Kalman gain, i.e., is increasing
with the degree of inattention (see online appendix for the derivation).
Following Barro (2007), we use (58) to compute the welfare e¤ects of changes in channel
capacity and compare them with those from proportionate changes in the initial level of the
perceived state (bs0). Specically, the relative marginal welfare losses (rmw ) due to imperfect
information at di¤erent capacity () can be written as
rmw =
@bv=@
(@bv=@bs0) bs0 =   1  (R  1) bs20 + cbs0
 
1 R2 exp ( 2)!2
[1  exp ( 2)R2]2 > 0; (68)
where @bv@bs0 =   (R  1)Rbs0 +Rc > 0, @bv@ =  12R@!2@K @K@ > 0 is evaluated for given bs0, Expression
(68) gives the proportionate increase in bs0 that compensates, at the margin, for an reduction in
capacity  devoted to monitoring the state, in the sense of preserving the lifetime utility. Using
Expression (68), it is straightforward to show that @(rmw)@ < 0. Denote by f () =
exp( 2)
[1 exp( 2)R2]2 .
It is clear that only the f () term is important for the e¤ects of RI on rmw . Figure 4 illustrates
how capacity  a¤ects f () and rmw when R = 1:01. It clearly shows that RI can have signicant
e¤ects the relative marginal welfare losses when capacity devoted to monitoring the state is low.
For example, when  = 0:2 nats, f = 16:6, whereas f = 0:45 when  = 1 nat.
To do quantitative welfare analysis, we need to know the level of the initial level of permanent
income, bs0. For simplicity we assume that bs0 is just mean permanent income. To compute bs0,
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denote by  the local coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, which equals  = E[y]c E[y] for the utility
function u () evaluated at mean income E [y]. Here we impose  = 0:9971 such that the annual
real interest rate is 2:5%. We then follow the procedure used in Hansen and Sargent (2004) and
use the estimated one-factor endowment process as follows
yt+1 = 0:9992yt + "t+1; (69)
and "t+1 follows an iid process distributed as N
 
0; 5:58192

. Here we set the coe¢ cient of vari-
ation of endowment, sd [yt] =E [yt], to be 0:1, which can be used to compute the mean income
level E [y] = 1396 and then the value of the bliss point c that generates reasonable relative risk
aversion . For example, when the local CRRA  is set to 1, we have c = 2E [y] = 2792. Fur-
thermore, assume that the ratio of mean nancial wealth to mean labor income, E [w] =E [y], is
5.24 Since st = wt + 1R 0:9992yt and t =
"t
R 0:9992 we have E [s] =

5 + 1R 0:9992

E [y] :Given this
specication and set the values of  and R, we can use (68) to compute the welfare e¤ects of nite
capacity quantitatively. Figure 5 illustrates the values of rmw at di¤erent capacity for given .
We can see that rmw is decreasing with , i.e., the proportionate increase in bs0 that compensates
for an reduction in  in the sense of preserving the lifetime utility is increasing with the degree
of inattention.25 For example, given  = 1, when  = 0:2 nats, rmw = 2:7127  10 2%, whereas
rmw = 9:0105  10 4% when  = 1 nat. That is, if the agents capacity is reduced from 1 bit to
0:2 nats, the proportionate increase in bs0 that compensates for an reduction in  in the sense of
preserving the expected utility will be increased by about 30 times. Hence, if the level of bs0 is
large, the agent would have strong incentive to reallocate more capacity to monitor this state if
he is allowed to adjust his capacity.
After the government implements the stabilization policies that reduces the variance of the
shock from !2 to 0:5!
2
 , the economy switches to a more stable environment. If we relax the
assumption that  is xed and assume that the marginal cost of information  is xed, the corre-
sponding  will be reduced from 0:78 to 0:57 nats, i.e., some capacity will be reallocated to other
sources to increase the economic e¢ ciency because a reduction in macroeconomic uncertainty
24This number varies substantially for di¤erent individuals, from 2 to 20. 5 is the average wealth/income ratio
in the Survey of Consumer Finances 2001.
25 In addition, given , rmw is increasing with . That is, agents who are more risk averse require more compen-
sation for a reduction in capacity to maintain the initial level of expected utility.
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leads to smaller marginal welfare losses due to RI. In this case, the Kalman gain  will fall from
0:79 to 0:68 accordingly; consequently, the dynamic behavior in the RI model will also change in
response to the change in !2 .
4.2 The Multivariate Case
In this section we solve for optimal steady state  and  in a parametric multivariate RI permanent
income model and then illustrate the di¤erences between RI and SE problems. This example is
similar to that discussed in Sims (2003) and considers multiple income shocks with di¤erent
stochastic properties. Specically, we assume that the original budget constraint is as follows
wt+1 = Rwt   ct + yt+1; (70)
where wt is the amount of cash-in-hand, and the income process yt have two persistent components
(x and z) and one transitory component ("y;t):
yt = y + xt + zt + "y;t;
xt = 0:99xt 1 + "x;t;
zt = 0:95zt 1 + "z;t;
with

 = var
26664
"y;t
"x;t
"z;t
37775 = 10 3
26664
0:9 0 0
0 0:009 0
0 0 0:27
37775 ; (71)
where xt is the most persistent and smooth component and "y;t is the most transitory and volatile
component. For the quadratic utility function u(ct) =  12 (ct   c)2, the model economy can be
characterized as the following three equations system:26664
wt
xt
zt
37775 =
26664
R 0:99 0:95
0 0:99 0
0 0 0:95
37775
26664
wt 1
xt 1
zt 1
37775+
26664
 1
0
0
37775 (ct 1   c)+
26664
1 1 1
0 1 0
0 0 1
37775
26664
"y;t
"x;t
"z;t
37775+
26664
y   c
0
0
37775 ;
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where  is set to 0:95. Using the rst welfare criterion (32) provided in Section 3.2, we can
compute that
 = 10 3
26664
0:1399  0:0737  0:0110
 0:0737 0:1596  0:1820
 0:0110  0:1820 0:5555
37775 ; (72)
when capacity  = 2:2 bits, which can be used to compute the variance of the noise  using
 1 =  1   	 1, and then compute the Kalman gain according to  =  1. It is clear from
(72) that due to the low capacity devoted to monitoring the state, the post-observation variances
(i.e., the conditional variances) of the x and z components are both greater than the corresponding
innovation variances in (71). More importantly, the conditional variance of the slow-moving x
component is 18 times larger than its corresponding innovation variance, whereas that of the
fast-moving z component is only 2 times larger than its innovation variance.26 The intuition
behind this result is that the optimizing agent devotes much less capacity to monitoring the
slow-moving component, which leads to greater impacts on the conditional variance term. Figure
6 plots the impulse responses of consumption to the income shocks and noises. It shows that
consumption reacts to the income shocks gradually and with delay, and reacts to the corresponding
noises promptly. In addition, we can see that the response of consumption to the slow-moving
x component is much more damped than that to the fast-moving z component. It is also worth
noting that since the agent only cares about the trace of Z and the symmetric matrix Z is
negative semidenite, the agent with low capacity will choose to make the post-observations
of the states be negatively correlated. This correlation conserves capacity by permitting some
information about each state to be transmitted using a single nat.
When we relax the information-processing capacity and increase  to 2:8 nats, the conditional
covariance matrix becomes
 = 10 3
26664
0:0787  0:0419 0:0153
 0:0419 0:1172  0:1926
0:0153  0:1926 0:5170
37775 : (73)
26Alternatively, we can also see that the conditional variance of the x component is about 3 times smaller than
its corresponding unconditional variance (0:4523), whereas that of the z component is about 5 times smaller than
its corresponding unconditional variance (2:7692).
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Comparing (72) with (73), we can see that relaxing information-processing capacity has the largest
impact on the conditional variance of the endogenous state variable w: the post-observation
variance of w is reduced to about half the initial value. The intuition behind this result is that
the endogenous variable plays the most important role in a¤ecting the welfare losses due to RI.
To see this clearly, the matrix Z is displayed here:
Z = 10 2
26664
 0:0204  0:6732  0:2769
 0:6732  22:2156  9:1363
 0:2769  9:1363  3:7573
37775 : (74)
While w per unit has less of an e¤ect on welfare, it is proportionally much larger than either of the
other two state variables. It is also clear that as the information constraint is relaxed the agent
chooses to allocate more capacity to monitoring the slow-moving component x than to monitoring
the z component.
Note that in the RI problem (72) is optimal in sense that it minimizes the expected welfare
losses due to nite information-processing capacity by allocating xed capacity optimally across
di¤erent elements in the state vector. In contrast, in the SE problem,  must be specied rst
and then  and K can be computed. However, it is di¢ cult to specify  without prior knowledge
about the states. Ad hoc assumptions on  might be inconsistent with the underlying e¢ ciency
conditions. Therefore, RI could provide a useful way to specify the stochastic properties of the
noises by solving the agents optimization problem subject to information constraints. As we have
noted previously, Melosi (2009) presents an application of this idea; he notes that a particular
estimated model shows that the marginal utility of information is not equated across variables
and is thus inconsistent with RI (that is, inconsistent with any value for .)
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the implications of two informational frictions theories, signal
extraction and rational inattention, for economic behavior, policy, and welfare within the linear-
quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) setting. First, we showed that if the variance of the noise itself is xed
exogenously, the two theories can be distinguished as they lead to di¤erent dynamics and welfare
after implementing government policies. Second, we showed that if the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
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in the SE problem is xed and channel capacity in the RI problem, SE and RI is observationally
equivalent in the sense that they lead to the same dynamics even after implementing policies in the
univariate case, whereas they generate di¤erent policy and welfare implications in the multivariate
case. Furthermore, in the multivariate case we showed that under RI the agents preference, budget
constraint, and information-processing constraints jointly determine the stochastic properties of
the post-observation variance and endogenous noise; hence, RI provides an e¢ cient way to specify
the nature of the Kalman gain that governs the models dynamics.
Distinguishing between SE and RI has policy relevance beyond the simple examples we consider
here. Paciello and Wiederholt (2011) study the optimal monetary policy in a model that nests
both SE and RI. They nd that the policy can di¤er across the two types of models the key
is that under RI the policymaker can a¤ect the attention allocation between di¤erent shocks.
In particular, they nd that the divine coincidence of no tradeo¤ between stabilizing prices and
output holds under RI, but not under SE.
Extending our results to compare environments outside the linear-quadratic-Gaussian setup
will be challenging. Solving the SE problem is straightforward, although computation of the
conditional expectations may be di¢ cult depending on the distributional assumptions. The RI
problem is di¢ cult to solve, however, because the optimal joint distribution of states and controls
is typically not of a known form and not easy to approximate; the optimality of discrete solutions
discussed in Matejka and Sims (2010) make it di¢ cult to characterize the distribution in terms
of a small number of parameters. It seems therefore unlikely that SE and RI environments will
be observationally equivalent.
6 Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
6.1 Solving for the Steady State Conditional Variance-Covariance Matrix
Assume that the value functions under full information and imperfect information can be written
as
v (st) = s
T
t Pst
and bv (bst) = bsTt bPbst
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respectively. Note that the two value functions satisfy the following Bellman equations
v (st) = s
T
t
 
Q+ F TRF   2F TW  st + Et  v  st+1 ; (75)
bv (bst) = Et sTt Qst + bsTt F TRFbst   2bsTt F TWst+ Et [bv (bst+1)] ; (76)
where
st+1 = Ast  BFst + "t+1
is the value of st+1 when the agent can observe st perfectly. The agent thus chooses the steady
state conditional covariance matrix  to minimize the expected welfare loss due to imperfect
observations:
Et [v (st)]  bv (bst) = Et sTt Pst  bsTt bPbst: (77)
Substituting the two Bellman equations into this objective function gives
Et

sTt Pst
  bsTt bPbst
= Et

sTt
 
Q+ F TRF   2F TW  st+ Et sTt+1Pst+1
  Et

sTt Qst + bsTt F TRFbst   2bsTt F TWst  Et hbsTt+1 bPbst+1i
= Et

sTt
 
Q+ F TRF   2F TW  st  Et sTt Qst + bsTt F TRFbst   2bsTt F TWst
+ Et
h
sTt+1Ps

t+1   bsTt+1 bPbst+1i
= Et

sTt
 
Q+ F TRF   2F TW  st  Et sTt Qst + bsTt F TRFbst   2bsTt F TWst
+ Et
h
sTt+1Ps

t+1   bsTt+1 bPbst+1i
= trace
  
F TRF   2F TW + Et hsTt+1Pst+1   bsTt+1 bPbst+1i
= trace
  
F TRF   2F TW + Et hsTt+1Pst+1   sTt+1Pst+1 + sTt+1Pst+1   bsTt+1 bPbst+1i
Given the LQ setting, Et

sTt Pst
  bsTt bPbst is a constant. Call this constant M . Then
M = Et

sTt Pst
  bsTt bPbst = trace   F TRF   2F TW + Et sTt+1Pst+1   sTt+1Pst+1+ M;
which means that
(1  )M = trace   F TRF   2F TW + Et sTt+1Pst+1   sTt+1Pst+1 :
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Using the denitions of st+1 and st+1, we obtain
(1  )M = trace   F TRF   2F TW + Et
24  sTt   bsTt F TBTPBF (st   bst)
+2
 
sTt   bsTt F TBTP (Ast  BFbst + "t+1)
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= trace
 
F TRF   2F TW +   F TBTPBF + F TBTPA+ATPBF 
= trace (Z) ;
where Z is a constant matrix.
6.2 Deriving the Conditional Welfare Gap
Given the value functions under RE and RI in the main tex, we have
 (;K) = Et [v (st)  bv (bst)] (78)
=  (R  1)R
2
Et

s2t

+RcEt [st]  1
2
R

1
R  1c
2 + !2

 

 (R  1)R
2
bs2t +Rcbst   12R

1
R  1c
2 + !2

=  (R  1)R
2
 
var t [st] + bs2t   12R!2  

 (R  1)R
2
bs2t   12R!2

=  (R  1)R
2
var t [st]  1
2
R
 
!2   !2

=  (R  1)R
2
 +
1
2
R


1  (1  )R2   1

!2 ;
which is just the expression for the welfare loss in the main text. The above expression can be
further simplied as follows:
 (;K) =  (R  1)R
2
  1
2
R
 
!2   !2

=  (R  1)R
2
 +
1
2
R


1  (1  )R2   1

!2
=
1
2
!2 (R  1)
(1  )R2
1  (1  )R2 ;
where we use that the fact that  =
!2
1=(1 ) R2 and !
2
 =

1 (1 )R2!
2
 .
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Figure 3: Consumption Dynamics under SE and RI after Policy
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Figure 4: E¤ects of RI on RMW
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Figure 5: E¤ects of RI on RMW
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Figure 6: Responses of Consumption to Income Shocks and Noises
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